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ABSTRACT. I describe in this paper an ontological solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem. I begin 
with describing the Entanglement urn experiment. I restate first the Sleeping Beauty problem from a 
wider perspective than the usual opposition between halfers and thirders. I also argue that the Sleeping 
Beauty experiment  is  best  modelled with the Entanglement urn.  I  draw then the consequences of 
considering  that  some balls  in  the Entanglement  urn  have ontologically  different  properties  form 
normal ones. The upshot is that I endorse the halfer conclusion on the probability of Heads once 
beauty is awaken and the thirder conclusion on conditional probabilities, and that original conclusions 
ensue on the probability of waking on Monday. 
1. The Entanglement urn
Let us consider the following experiment. In front of you is a urn. The experimenter asks you to study 
very carefully the properties of the balls that are in the urn. You go up then to the urn and begin to 
examine carefully its content. You note first that the urn contains only red or green balls. By curiosity, 
you decide to take a sample in the urn of a red ball. Surprisingly, you notice that while you catch this 
red ball, another ball, but of green colour, also moves simultaneously. You decide then to replace the 
red ball in the urn and you notice that immediately, the latter green ball also springs back in the urn. 
Intrigued, you decide then to catch this green ball. You note then that the red ball also goes out of the 
urn at the same time. Furthermore, while you replace the green ball in the urn, the red ball also springs 
back at the same time at its initial position in the urn. You decide then to withdraw another red ball 
from the urn. But while it goes out of the urn, nothing else occurs. Taken aback, you decide then to 
undertake a systematic and rigorous study of all balls present in the urn. 
At the end of several hours of a meticulous examination, you are now capable of describing precisely 
the properties of the balls present in the urn. The latter contains in total 1000 red balls and 500 green 
balls. Among the red balls, 500 are completely normal balls. But 500 other red balls have completely 
surprising properties. Indeed, each of them is linked to a different green ball. When you take away one 
of these red balls, the green ball which is linked to it also goes out at the same time of the urn, as 
though it was linked to the red ball by a magnetic force. The red ball and the green ball which is linked 
to it behave then as one single object. Indeed, if you take away the red ball from the urn, the linked 
green ball is also extracted instantly. And conversely, if you withdraw from the urn one of the green 
balls, the red ball which is linked to it goes out immediately of the urn. You even tried to destroy one 
of the balls of a linked pair of balls, and you noticed that in such case, the ball of the other colour 
which is indissociably linked to it was also destroyed instantaneously. Indeed, it appears to you that 
these pairs of balls behave as one single object. 
The functioning of this urn leaves you somewhat perplexed. In particular, your are intrigued by the 
properties of the pairs of correlated balls. After reflection, you tell yourself that the properties of the 
pairs of correlated balls are finally in all respects identical to those of two entangled quantum objects. 
The entanglement (Aspect & al. 1982) is indeed the phenomenon which links up two photons, for 
example, so that when one modifies the quantum state of one of the entangled photons, the quantum 
state of the other one is instantly modified accordingly, whatever the distance where it is situated. 
Indeed, the pair of entangled photons really behave as one and the same object. You decide to call 
“Entanglement urn” this urn with its astonishing properties. After reflection, what appears peculiar in 
this urn, is that it includes at the same time normal and entangled balls. The normal red balls have 
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nothing different with our familiar balls. But entangled balls behave in a completely different way. 
What is amazing, you think, is that nothing seemingly differentiates the normal red balls from the red 
entangled ones. You tell yourself finally that it could be confusing.
Your reflection on the pairs of entangled balls and their properties also leads you to question the way 
the balls which compose the pairs of entangled balls are to be counted. Are they counted as normal 
balls? Or do specific rules govern the way pairs of entangled balls are counted? You add a normal red 
ball in an Entanglement urn. It is then necessary to increment the number of red balls present in the 
urn. On the other hand, the total number of green balls is unaffected. But what is it when you add in 
the Entanglement urn the red ball of a pair of entangled balls? In that case, the linked green ball of the 
same pair of entangled balls is also added in the urn instantly. Hence, when you add a red ball of a pair 
of entangled balls in the urn, it proves to be that you also add at the same time, its linked green ball. 
So, in that case, you must increment the total number of red balls, but also the total number of green 
balls present in the urn. In the same way, if you subtract a normal red ball from the urn, you simply 
decrement the total number of red balls of the urn, without changing the number of green balls present 
in the urn. But if you remove a red ball (resp. green) of a pair of entangled balls, you must decrement 
the total number of red balls (resp. green) present in the urn as well as the total number of green balls 
(resp. red). 
At this  very moment,  the experimenter happens again and withdraws all  balls  from the urn.  He 
announces that you are going to participate in the following experiment: 
The  Entanglement  urn A  fair  coin  will  be  randomly  tossed.  If  the  coin  lands  Heads,  the 
experimenter will put a normal red ball in the urn. On the other hand, if the coin lands Tails, he will 
put a pair of entangled balls in the urn, composed of a red ball and a green ball, both indissociably 
linked. The experimenter also adds that the room will be put in absolute darkness, and that you will 
therefore be completely unable to detect the colour of the balls, no more that you will be able to 
know, when you will have withdrawn a ball from the urn, whether it is a normal ball, or a ball 
which is part of a pair of entangled balls. The experimenter tosses the coin and while you catch a 
ball from the urn, he asks you to assess the likelihood that the coin felt Heads. 
2. The Sleeping Beauty problem
Consider now the well-known  Sleeping Beauty problem (Elga 2000, Lewis 2001). Sleeping Beauty 
learns that she will be put into sleep on Sunday by some researchers. A fair coin will be tossed and if 
the coin lands Heads, Beauty will be awaken once on Monday. On the other hand, if the coin lands 
Tails, Beauty will be awaken twice: on Monday and on Tuesday. After each waking, she will be put 
into sleep again and she will forget that waking. On awakening on Monday, what should be Beauty's 
credence that the coin did land Heads?
At this step, one obvious first answer (I) goes as follows: since the coin is fair, the initial probability 
that the coin lands Head is 1/2. And during the course of the experiment, Sleeping Beauty doesn't get 
any novel information. Hence, the probability of Heads still remains 1/2.
By contrast, an alternative reasoning (II) runs as follows. Suppose that the experiment is repeated 
many times, say, to fix ideas, 1000 times. Then there will be approximately 500 Heads-wakings on 
Monday, 500 Tails-wakings on Monday and 500 Tails-wakings on Tuesday. Hence, the reasoning 
goes, the probability of Heads equals 500/1500 = 1/3. 
The  argument  for  1/2  and  the  argument  for  1/3  yield  conflicting  conclusions.  But  these  two 
concurrent lines of reasoning are also accompanied with a calculation of the probability of waking on 
Monday and on Tuesday. To simplify matters, a Monday waking can be modelled with a red ball, and 
a Tuesday waking with a green ball. Now from the halfer perspective, the probability P(R) of drawing 
a red ball (this is tantamount to the probability of  waking on Monday) is such that P(R) = 3/4. And 
conversely, the  probability P(G) of drawing a green ball  (this  is tantamount to the probability of 
waking on Tuesday) is such that P(G) = 1/4. By contrast, from the thirder's perspective, the probability 
P(R) of drawing a red ball equals 2/3 and the probability P(G) of drawing a green ball equals 1/3.
But this  is  not  the whole story.  In effect,  the argument for 1/2 and for  1/3 also have their  own 
account of conditional probabilities. To begin with, the probability P(Heads|G) of Heads on drawing a 
green ball is not a subject of disagreement, for it equals 0 in both accounts. The same goes for the 
probability P(Tails|G) of Tails on drawing a green ball, since it equals 1 from the halfer's or from the 
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thirder's viewpoint. But agreement stops when one considers the probability P(Heads|R) of Heads on 
drawing  a  red  ball.  For  P(Heads|R)  =  2/3  for  a  halfer  and  P(Heads|R)  =  1/2  from  a  thirder's 
perspective. On the other hand, the probability P(Tails|R) of Tails on drawing a red ball is 1/3 from a 
halfer standpoint, and 1/2 for a thirder.
3. An ontological account based on the Entanglement urn
In what follows, I shall present an ontological solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem, which rests 
basically on the Entanglement urn experiment. A consequence of this account is that it incorporates 
insights from the halfer and thirder standpoints, a line of resolution initiated by Nick Bostrom (2007)1. 
The Sleeping Beauty problem is usually presented as a problem arising from conflicting conclusions 
resulting from two concurrent lines of assigning the probability of Heads once Beauty is awaken: the 
argument for 1/2 and the argument for 1/3. I shall argue, however, that this description of the Sleeping 
Beauty problem is misleading and that we need to envisage the issue from a wider perspective. For 
present purposes, the Sleeping Beauty problem is the issue of calculating properly (i) the probability of 
Heads  (resp.  Tails)  once  Beauty  is  awaken;  (ii)  the  probability  of  a  waking  on  Monday  (resp. 
Tuesday);  and (iii)  the  probability  of  Heads  (resp.  Tails)  on waking on  Monday.  In  this  broader 
context,  I  shall  argue that  the halfer's  response  is  right  with regard to the first  question,  that  the 
thirder's  answer  is  right  with  respect  to  the  second  question,  and  that  both  halfer's  and  thirder's 
responses are wrong with regard to the third question. The reminder of this paper will explain how 
these prima facie surprising results are consistently obtained.
To begin with, the present solution will endorse the halfer conclusion, with regard to the probability 
of Heads, once Beauty is awaken. I shall argue then that the argument for 1/3 is fallacious and that the 
Entanglement urn experiment casts light on the  flaw in reasoning (II). Let us examine this in more 
detail. To begin with, it appears that the argument for 1/3 is based on a urn analogy. This analogy 
associates the situation inherent to the Sleeping Beauty experiment with a urn that contains, in the long 
run (assuming that the experiment is repeated 1000 times), 500 red balls (Heads-wakings on Monday), 
500 red balls (Tails-wakings on Monday) and 500 green balls (Tails-wakings on Tuesday), i.e. 1000 
red balls and 500 green balls. The corresponding urn contains then 1000 red balls and 500 green balls. 
For present purposes, let us call this sort of urn a “standard urn”. Now it appears that the argument for 
1/3 is based on a urn analogy with this standard urn and that the probability of Heads is determined by 
the ratio of the number of Heads-wakings among the total number of wakings. At this step, a question 
arises: is the analogy with the  standard urn well-grounded in the argument for 1/3? In other terms, 
isn't another urn model best suited to the iterated Sleeping Beauty experiment? In the present context, 
this  alternative  can  be  formulated  more  accurately  as  follows:  isn't  the  situation  inherent  to  the 
Sleeping Beauty experiment better put in analogy with the  Entanglement urn, rather than with the 
standard urn? It  strikes me that  the standard urn fails  to do justice to an essential  feature of  the 
experiment: in the Tails case, the Monday waking and the Tuesday waking are correlated; while on the 
other hand, the Monday waking in the Heads case is independent. Let us examine this in more detail.
The intuition  underlying  the  argument  for  1/3  in  the  Sleeping Beauty experiment  is  that  one is 
entitled to add unrestrictedly red and green balls to compute frequencies. However, I shall argue that 
this intuition is misleading, as the Entanglement urn experiment suggests. For in reasoning (II), one 
feels intuitively entitled to add red-Heads (Heads-wakings on Monday), red-Tails (Tails-wakings on 
Monday) and green-Tails (Tails-wakings on Tuesday) balls to compute frequencies. But red-Heads 
and red-Tails balls appear to be objects of a fundamentally different nature in the present context. In 
effect,  red-Heads  balls  are  in  all  respects  similar  to  our  familiar  objects,  and  can  be  considered 
properly as single objects.  By contrast,  it  appears that  red-Tails  balls  are quite indissociable from 
green-Tails balls. For we cannot draw a red-Tails ball without picking the associated green-Tails ball. 
And conversely, we cannot draw a green-Tails ball without picking the associated red-Tails ball. In 
this sense, red-Tails balls and the associated green-Tails balls do not behave as our familiar objects, 
but are much similar to entangled quantum objects. For Monday-Tails wakings are indissociable from 
1 Bostrom opens the path to a third way out to the Sleeping Beauty problem: “At any rate, one might hope that 
having a third contender  for  how Beauty should reason will  help stimulate  new ideas in the study of  self-
location”.  In  his  account,  Bostrom sides  with  the  halfer  on  P(Heads)  and  with  the  thirder  on  conditional 
probabilities, but his treatment has some counter-intuitive consequences on conditional probabilities. As far as I 
can see, the present account is devoid of these drawbacks on conditional probabilities.
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Tuesday-Tails  wakings.  And Beauty cannot  be awaken on Monday (resp.  Tuesday) without being 
awaken on Tuesday (resp. Monday).  From this viewpoint, it  is mistaken to consider red-Tails and 
green-Tails balls as separate objects. The correct intuition is that the a red-Tails and the associated 
green-Tails ball are a pair of entangled balls and constitute but one single object. In this context, red-
Tails and green-Tails balls are best seen intuitively as constituents and mere parts of one single object. 
In other words, red-Heads balls and, on the other hand, red-Tails and green-Tails balls,  cannot be 
considered as objects of the same type for probability purposes. And this situation justifies the fact that 
one  is  not  entitled  to  add  unrestrictedly  red-Heads,  red-Tails  and  green-Tails  balls  to  compute 
probability frequencies. For in this case, one adds objects of intrinsically different types, i.e. one single 
object with the mere part of another single object.
Now the key point appears to be the following one. Consider the Entanglement urn. Normal red balls 
behave as usual. But entangled balls do behave differently, with regard to statistics. Suppose I add the 
red  ball  of  an  entangled  pair  in  the  Entanglement  urn.  Then  I  also  add  instantly  in  the  urn  the 
associated green ball  of the entangled pair.  Suppose, conversely,  that  I  remove the red ball  of  an 
entangled pair from the urn. Then I also remove instantly the associated green ball. The same goes 
now for Sleeping Beauty, as the analogy suggests. And the consequences are not so that innocuous. 
What is the probability of a waking on Monday? This is tantamount to calculating the probability P(R) 
of drawing a red ball in the Entanglement urn? On Heads, the probability of drawing a red ball is 1. On 
Tails, we can either draw the red or the green ball of an entangled pair. But it should be pointed out 
that if we pick on Tails the green ball of an entangled pair, we also draw instantly the associated red 
ball. Hence, the probability of drawing a red ball on Tails is also 1. Thus, P(R) = 1/2 x 1 + 1/2 x 1 = 1.  
Conversely, what is the probability of a waking on Tuesday? This is tantamount to the probability 
P(G) of drawing a green ball. The probability of drawing a green ball is 0 in the Heads case, but 1 in 
the Tails case. For in the latter case, either we draw the green or the red ball of an entangled pair. But 
even if we draw the red ball of the entangled pair, we draw then instantly the associated green ball. 
Hence, P(G) = 1/2 x 0 + 1/2 x 1 = 1/2. To sum up: P(R) = 1 and P(G) = 1/2. The probability of a 
waking on Monday is then 1, and the probability of a waking on Tuesday is 1/2.
From the above, it results that P(R) + P(G) = 1 + 1/2 = 1,5. In the present account, this results from 
the fact that drawing a red ball and drawing a green ball – in general – are not exclusive events. And – 
in particular  – drawing a red ball and drawing a green ball from an entangled pair are not exclusive 
events for probability purposes. For we cannot draw the a red-Tails (resp. green-Tails) ball without 
drawing the associated green-Tails (resp. red-Tails) ball. The fact that drawing a red-Tails and drawing 
a green-Tails ball are not exclusive events is overlooked in the argument for 1/3, and notably in Elga's 
(Elga 2000) formulation of the argument for 1/3. For Elga enumerates first three possibilities: drawing 
a red-Heads ball (in Elga's terminology, H1: Heads and it is Monday), a red-Tails ball (T1: Tails and it  
is Monday) or a green-Tails ball (T2: Tails and it is Tuesday). Elga infers then that the probability of 
these three events are equal: P(H1) = P(T1) = P(T2). And, the reasoning goes, as these probabilities 
sum to 1, P(H1) = P(T1) = P(T2) = 1/3. But as we did see it, the flaw in this reasoning now appears 
clearly: it is the step that considers that these three probabilities sum to 1. In effect, as we did see it, 
these three events are not exclusive of one another, causing their overall probabilities sum to 1,5.
Now the preceding developments also have some consequences on conditional probabilities. Let us 
recall first how these latter are calculated on the two concurrent standard lines of reasoning. To begin 
with, the probability P(Heads|G) of Heads on drawing a green ball is not a subject of disagreement for 
halfers and thirders, since it equals 0 in both accounts. The same goes for the probability P(Tails|G) of 
Tails on drawing a green ball, since it equals 1 from a halfer or thirder viewpoint. But agreement stops 
when one considers the probability P(Heads|R) of Heads on drawing a red ball. For P(Heads|R) = 2/3 
for a halfer and P(Heads|R) = 1/2 from a thirder's perspective. On the other hand, the probability 
P(Tails|R) of Tails on drawing a red ball is 1/3 from a halfer standpoint, and 1/2 for a thirder. In the 
present account, P(Heads|G) = 0 and P(Tails|G) = 1, as usual. But P(Heads|R) is calculated as follows. 
P(Heads|R) = [P(Heads) x P(R|Heads)] / P(R) = [1/2 x  1] / 1 =  1/2. And the same goes for P(Tails|R):  
P(Tails|R)  = [P(Tails)  x P(R|Tails)]  /  P(R) = [1/2 x 1]  /  1 =  1/2.  The upshot  is  that  conditional 
probabilities are calculated in the same way as from a thirder's perspective.
Finally, the above results are summarised in the following table:
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halfer thirder present account
P(Heads) 1/2 1/3 1/2
P(Tails) 1/2 2/3 1/2
P(waking on Monday) ≡ P(R) 3/4 2/3 1
P(waking on Tuesday) ≡ P(G) 1/4 1/3 1/2
P(Heads| waking on Monday) ≡ P(Heads|R) 2/3 1/2 1/2
P(Tails| waking on Monday) ≡ P(Tails|R) 1/3 1/2 1/2
4. Handling the variations of the Sleeping Beauty problem
From the above, it follows that the present treatment of the Sleeping Beauty problem, is capable of 
handling several variations of the original problem which have recently flourished in the literature. For 
the above solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem applies straightforwardly, I shall argue, to these 
variations  of  the  original  experiment.  Let  us  consider,  to  begin  with,  a  variation  were  on Heads, 
Sleeping  Beauty  is  not  awaken  on  Monday  but  instead  on  Tuesday.  This  is  modelled  with  an 
Entanglement urn that receives one normal green ball (instead of a red one in the original experiment) 
in the Heads case.
Let us suppose, second, that  Sleeping Beauty is awaken two times on Monday in the Tails case 
(instead of being awaken on both Monday and Tuesday). This is then modelled with an Entanglement 
urn that receives one pair of entangled balls which are composed of two red balls in the Tails case. 
(instead of a pair of entangled balls composed of a red and a green ball in the original experiment).
Let us imagine, third, that Beauty is awaken two times  – on Monday and Tuesday – in the Heads 
case, and three times – on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday – in the Tails case. This is then modelled 
with an Entanglement urn that receives one pair of entangled balls composed of one red ball and one 
green ball  in the Heads case;  in the Tails  case,  the Entanglement  urn is filled with one triplet  of 
entangled balls, composed of a red, a green and a blue ball.
Let us also envisage another variation:2 on Heads, Beauty is awaken once either on Monday or on 
Tuesday (determined randomly). In this variant, from the halfer's viewpoint, we get: P(Heads = 1/2); 
in addition, P(R) = P(G) = 1/2; and finally, P(Heads|R) = 1/2. On the other hand, P(Heads) = 1/3 from 
the thirder's perspective; and P(R) = P(G) = 1/2; lastly, P(Heads|R) = 1/3. In the present account, this 
is modelled with a urn that contains one red ball or one green ball in the Heads case, and one pair of 
red and green entangled balls. We get then  accordingly: P(Heads) = 1/2, P(R) = 1/2 x 1/2 + 1 x 1/2 = 
3/4 and P(G) = 1/2 x 1/2 + 1 x 1/2 = 3/4. And also: P(Heads|R) = 1/2.
 
Finally, the lesson of the Sleeping Beauty Problem appear  to  be the following:  our current  and 
familiar objects or concepts such as balls, wakings, etc. should not be considered as the sole relevant 
classes of objects for probability purposes. We should bear in mind that according to an unformalised 
axiom of probability theory, a given situation is standardly modelled with the help of urns, dices, balls, 
etc. But the rules that allow for these simplifications lack an explicit formulation. However in certain 
situations, in order to reason properly, it is also necessary to take into account somewhat unfamiliar 
objects whose constituents are pairs of indissociable balls or of mutually inseparable wakings, etc. 
This lesson was anticipated by Nelson Goodman, who pointed out in Ways of Worldmaking that some 
objects  which  are  prima  facie  completely  different  from  our  familiar  objects  also  deserve 
consideration:  ‘we do not  welcome molecules  or  concreta  as  elements of  our everyday world,  or 
combine tomatoes and triangles and typewriters and tyrants and tornadoes into a single kind’.3 As we 
did see it, in some cases, we cannot add unrestrictedly an object of the Heads-world with an object of 
the Tails-world. For drawing a red ball and drawing a green ball in the Tails-world are not exclusive 
events. The upshot is that, in order to preserve our standard way of evaluating probabilities, we need to 
incorporate  the  fact  that  drawing  one  ball  of  an  entangled  pair  is  not  exclusive  of  drawing  the 
associated ball.  And the status of  our paradigm probabilistic  object,  namely a ball,  appears  to be 
2 I thank Laurent Delabre for pointing out this variation to me (personal correspondence).
3Goodman (1978, p. 21).
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world-relative, since it can be a whole in the Heads-world and a part in the Tails-world. Once this 
goodmanian step  accomplished,  we  should  be  less  vulnerable  to  certain  subtle  cognitive  traps  in 
probabilistic reasoning.4
References
Arntzenius, F. (2002) Reflections on Sleeping Beauty, Analysis, 62-1, 53-62
Aspect, A., Dalibard, J. & Roger, G. (1982) Physical Review Letters. 49, 1804-1807.
Bostrom, N. (2002)  Anthropic Bias: Observation Selection Effects in Science and Philosophy,  New 
York: Routledge
Bostrom, N. (2007) Sleeping Beauty and Self-Location : A Hybrid Model, Synthese, 157, 59-78
Bradley, D. (2003) Sleeping Beauty: a note on Dorr's argument for 1/3, Analysis, 63, 266-268
Delabre, L. (2008) La Belle au Bois dormant: débat autour d'un paradoxe, manuscript.
Dorr, C. (2002) Sleeping Beauty: in Defence of Elga, Analysis, 62, 292-296
Elga, A. (2000) Self-locating Belief and the Sleeping Beauty Problem, Analysis, 60, 143-147
Goodman, N. (1978) Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company
Groisman, B. (2008) The End of Sleeping Beauty's Nightmare, British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science, 59(3):409-416
Lewis,  D. (1983) Attitudes de dicto and de se,  in  Philosophical Papers,  volume I,  133-159, New 
York: Oxford University Press
Lewis, D. (2001) Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Elga, Analysis, 61, 171-176
Monton, B. (2002) Sleeping Beauty and the Forgetful Bayesian, Analysis, 62, 47-53
White, R. (2006) The generalized Sleeping Beauty problem : A challenge for thirders,  Analysis, 66, 
114-119.
4I  thank Jean-Paul  Delahaye and Claude  Panaccio  for  useful  discussion.  Special  thanks are  due  to  Laurent 
Delabre for  stimulating correspondence.
6
